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A Critique of Antiphon’s Justice through
the Lens of Socrates’ Position on Nomoi
and Phusis
Mohammed Hossain
ABsTRAcT

Inquiries on justice, law, and natural order can often incite interesting debate and discussion. Questions such
as “what is justice” and “what is the role of law and natural order in relation to justice” are among these inquiries. Although they can have many implications for contemporary issues, these inquiries are certainly not
just modern problems by any means. In fact, these are fundamental questions about society that have been
posed since the days of Plato, Socrates, and pre-Socratic philosophers of Ancient Greece. Antiphon and Plato,
in particular, have interesting views on natural order and law, and they both offer opposing perspectives. I will
elaborate on both of their arguments about justice with respect to its relationship to the law and natural order,
as well as justify my position in support of Plato’s view—that Antiphon’s justice does not lead to a good life.

I

n Plato’s Crito, Antiphon and Socrates provide
interesting perspectives on life, justice, and the
relationship between laws and members of a society. Both discuss a seemingly opposing relationship
between laws that are written to govern a society and
the fundamental nature of people who are not inclined to follow these laws. A distinction is drawn
between what Antiphon dubs nomoi and phusis.
Nomoi represents laws that are made by individuals
of a society in order to establish social order. They are
made by mutual agreements between people to set
limitations on conduct. Phusis, on the other hand,
represents the natural order of the world and how
people function naturally. Although Socrates does
not explicitly use Antiphon’s language, he certainly
seems to develop arguments about the nature of people, laws created by individuals, and the criteria for a
good and just life. Overall, it is Socrates who provides
a better justification for the employment of nomoi in
living a good and just life. He posits a better method
for allowing members of a society to coexist with each
other while discouraging the possibility of acting unjustly and harming one another. Socrates’ account
provides a more plausible argument for a good life as
opposed to merely accounting for a free life with the
possibility of acting unjustly. In order to fully explain
this conclusion, I will discuss essential qualities of

nomoi and phusis, then discuss arguments provided
by both Antiphon and Socrates with regard to the
relationship between the two laws.
Fragments from Antiphon’s writing suggest that
nomoi is fundamentally different from phusis in
both origin and application. Nomoi are described as
“products of agreement, not of natural growth” and
“extra additions,” while phusis is juxtaposed as “products of natural growth, not agreement” and “necessary” (Antiphon, 2011, p. 156). In other words,
nomoi is a result of conventions and parameters created by individuals, while phusis is intrinsic to the
nature of the individuals themselves. In terms of their
application, nomoi is treated as “important in the
presence of witnesses,” while phusis is “treated as important while alone and with no witnesses present”
(Antiphon, 2011, p. 155). Under nomoi, individuals
are “free from penalty” if crimes are not noticed (if
they are noticed then crimes are punishable under
the law), while phusis is unaffected by observation.
The reason for this is that disputes cannot be easily
settled by the law if testimony is not provided by anyone other than the accuser and the accused; hence,
the presence of witnesses becomes important in order
to make one case more persuasive than another in
court. From these competing testimonies, justice is
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maintained by making punishments and amends accordingly. On the other hand, phusis is unaffected by
the presence of witnesses because it functions on the
will of an individual alone. According to phusis, people should be able to do what they wish, and if they
are truly just then they will not do harm to another
individual. The harm is not decided by testimony in
court, but rather by the circumstances and will of the
individuals involved. This is why it is said that under
phusis, people are only harmed “as a result of truth”
(Antiphon, 2011, p. 156). The nature of nomoi is to
set bonds on phusis. If phusis functions under the
utility of life, then nomoi is a restriction on that utility in order to establish social order.
Moreover, Antiphon claims that we live from what is
advantageous and die from what is not advantageous,
but the advantage of nomoi is simply generated from
bonds on phusis—this is perhaps where Antiphon
begins to move away from a semantic explanation
of nomoi and phusis and shifts towards developing
arguments concerning the importance of phusis in
living a good and just life. The advantages of nomoi
that establish social regularity (namely, creating laws
against theft, misdemeanor, violence, etc.) are only
possible by limiting the freedom of human nature
which often functions contrary to these bonds. A
problem arises, however, when assuming that nomoi
prevents harms from being inflicted on members of
a society. Although it may seem like laws can prevent
crime, upon inspection, nomoi does not prevent the
cause of harm, but merely provides the possibility of
punishment and recourse towards a crime inflicted.
As Antiphon (2011) puts it:
…justice that stems from nomoi is insufficient to aid those who submit. In the
first place, it permits the one who suffers to suffer and the wrongdoer to do
wrong, and it was not at the time of the
wrongdoing able to prevent either the
sufferer from suffering or the wrongdoer
from doing wrong. And when the case is
brought to trial for punishment, there is
no special advantage for the one who has
suffered and that he is able to exact the
penalty. And it is open to the wrongdoer
to deny it…. However convincing the accusation is on behalf of the accuser, the
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defense can be just as convincing. For
victory comes through speech (p. 157).
To illustrate this concept, if a business were to be
robbed of its merchandise, nomoi could not stop the
crime from actually occurring but merely punish the
thief and assist the victim. For this reason, it is argued
by Antiphon that nomoi is not truly advantageous;
it does not prevent harm or cause benefit. Furthermore, punishment for the criminal and recourse for
the victim are not guaranteed. They are largely dependent on the persuasiveness of arguments presented in court and not the truth. In this sense, it may be
reasonable to see how nomoi fails to bring a good and
just life to anyone in a society.
Socrates offers a very different view than Antiphon
on nomoi and phusis, starting with a disagreement
on Antiphon’s notion of an advantageous life. As
stated before, Antiphon asserts that phusis should be
preferred over nomoi due to the fact that nomoi does
not give one an advantageous life and phusis gives
one access to the full utility of one’s life. In direct opposition Plato’s (2002) character Socrates states that
the “…important thing is not life, but the good life”
(p. 48). This statement implies that a good life is one
in which individuals do not harm each other because
“doing people harm is no different from wrongdoing” (Plato, 2002, p. 49). In other words, living a
good life is distinct from merely living life as a utility, and the distinction stems from the unwillingness
of an individual to harm others. This starting point
is crucial for understanding why Socrates provides a
better justification for the employment of nomoi in
living a good and just life. By breaking bonds made
with nomoi, an individual cannot live a just life because he is doing harm to the city itself. As Socrates
puts it, a city can be destroyed if “…its courts have no
force” and if laws are “…nullified and set at naught
by private individuals” (Plato, 2002, p. 50). Societies can be destroyed if individuals choose to ignore
nomoi and purely follow phusis, which is not just or
good in any way. Furthermore, Socrates may disagree
with Antiphon’s belief that there are no advantages
to a life led by nomoi. He cites numerous examples
of advantages that Athens had provided him, such as
the marriage of his parents leading to his birth and
his education. Socrates states: “It is impious to bring
violence to bear against your mother or father; it is
much more so to use it against your country,” imply2
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ing that every person has a duty to the well-being of
their state, and any actions that prove contrary would
be impious, harmful, and ultimately unjust as well
(Plato, 2002, p. 51). Finally, he answers Antiphon’s
argument concerning nomoi “binding” phusis by
stating these duties one has (to their state) do not
bind or enslave people because they have the option
to either leave the state (through exile) or accept its
terms.
In sum, Socrates provides a more plausible account of
living a good and just life by first arguing that a good
life is more important than living one free of nomoi
and then demonstrating how nomoi fulfills the necessary criteria for providing one with a good life,
while phusis lacks in this respect. Antiphon’s notion
of justice is one in which phusis is used to live one’s
life to its fullest utility, but taking Socrates’ account
of justice may prove this idea to be problematic. Antiphon’s notion of justice does not practically prevent
individuals in a society from inflicting harm upon
each other; full utility of one’s actions implies possessing the autonomy to do harm. This is not justice,
at least when considering Socrates’ notion of goodness. In order to promote a good and just life, there
must be parameters established in order to prevent
people from harming each other. Perhaps one could
argue that locking up all the citizens of a society in
isolated jail cells would prevent harm, but paradoxically, this is would be very far from a just society. The
next best option, then, is to set rules and limitations
on the population, which may be enforced through
a series of punishments used to discourage socially
unacceptable actions through nomoi. The key notion
that Antiphon seems to skim over in his criticism of
nomoi is the utility of the laws to act as a practical
deterrent of harmful actions. This can be seen as Socrates’ answer to Antiphon’s major criticism of nomoi
(that it does not prevent harm but only punishes after the fact, resulting in no advantage): that it should
not only serve as a guideline delivering judgments in
court, but also guide our daily actions in order to
have everyone within a state function accordingly.
The result advances the good of everyone in the state
as a whole, which is ultimately how a just state and
its individuals should function.
For argument’s sake, let us suppose that Antiphon
may have considered that laws act as a deterrent. Given his previous position in support of phusis, perhaps
Published by KnightScholar, 2016

he would argue that some people have a natural inclination to break laws because they are contrary by
their nature, and therefore, adopting civility on the
basis of phusis might be more desirable. I believe that
an answer to this issue may simply be that Socrates
knew this to be true at times and supported nomoi
for this very reason. If people naturally possess an inclination to act contrarily to the benefit of a state as
a whole, then their actions must be limited in order
to ensure that harm is not done. Such an objection
would not be problematic for Socrates’ support of
nomoi. In fact, nomoi can be seen as more meaningful because of the very reason that it acts to limit natural ways in which people may harm each other. Another possible objection to Socrates’ position may be
that if nomoi is sometimes unjust, then obedience to
laws becomes unjust. One would then be required to
act unjustly if obeying the laws of a state, and would
be punished for acting justly in defiance of the law.
An example illustrating this argument may ironically
be Socrates’ unjust conviction. My answer to such a
scenario would simply be that nomoi is not necessarily a static set of rules, but can change and adapt
to circumstances based upon the will of members of
the society that establish laws; therefore, such unjust
nomoi would eventually change to become just. For
example, if an individual was convicted of a crime
under an unjust law, nomoi would dictate that this
individual would be sent to a court to be judged by
members of the society (the judge, jury, etc.). If a
compelling argument is made that the law does not
represent the values of a good and just society, then
the court could plausibly rule to change the laws itself and free the convicted man. Practical examples of
this would be many Supreme Court decisions (such
as Brown v. Board of Education and Plessy v. Ferguson),
which have been used to overrule previous laws that
were unjust. In sum, the dynamic nature of nomoi
would mean that unjust laws would eventually come
to change.
Considering the situation that Socrates was in (being
sent to his death due to a false conviction), it would
have been understandable for him to agree with Antiphon. After all, if justice had functioned flawlessly
under nomoi, he would not have been charged with
impiety or corrupting the youth. Nonetheless, Socrates fulfilled his duty as a citizen of Athens by refusing to run away and drinking the hemlock tea. Per-
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haps Socrates realized that although justice is often
difficult to define, we should not be hasty to assume
that there is something fundamentally problematic
with the idea of agreed limitations on conduct, especially if it is advantageous for the whole of a society.
Instead, we should work to have truth reveal itself
through discussion and argumentation in court, just
as many philosophers do through dialogue and academic disagreement.
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